Originally developed to compensate U.S. electric utilities for regulatory assets rendered uneconomic by deregulation, so-called "stranded cost" securitization techniques are finding new applications for the financing of mandatory pollution control equipment and other similar expenditures, for catastrophic storm reconstruction expenditures and, as proposed by the author, possibly for "synthetic" carbon emission reduction for new fossilfueled power plants or purchases.
contracts when U.S. gas supply and transportation services were "unbundled" in the mid-1980s; (2) the securitization of special charges to customers of affected utilities to finance compensation payments to such utilities under legislated nuclear power plant moratoria in Italy and Spain in the early 1990s; 5 and (3) a 1995 securitization by Puget Sound & Light 6 to finance a demand-side management program (essentially cash incentives to customers to replace less energy-efficient appliances with more energy-efficient items).
Ideally, the basic foundation for a stranded cost securitization is a sound legislative and regulatory scheme that provides for the following:
(1) an adequate hearing on the merits regarding the "costs" to be recovered and the alternative means of financing thereof (with the stranded costs securitization to be demonstrably superior to other such financing alternatives; however, this will often be the case since the securitization will allow a highly-rated financing for 100% of such costs), so as to substantially mitigate the risk of later reversal or adverse modification of the related regulatory approval;
(2) a regulatory approval (usually referred to as a "financing order") that authorizes the issuance of bonds that are secured or otherwise backed by the recovery of such costs and related securitization through non-bypassable charges to customers of the utility (sometimes referred to as a "network" charge -referring to the fact that the charge is payable by all customers using such network -and not readily "bypassable" by electing utility services that are not subject to such charges); (3) the characterization of the right to levy and collect the charges (and any increases therein required to "true-up" the amounts to be levied and collected so as to be sufficient to ensure full and timely repayments of the bonds backed by such charges) as a separate property right; (4) the "true sale" of the related property rights to the issuer in the related securitization to secure or otherwise back such securitization; and (5) a "pledge" by the applicable State to not impair such property right or the securitization thereof.
Additionally, as a practical matter, the level of such charges (and any likely required increase therein for such "true up" amounts) should be small enough that the risk of later customer or other political objection thereto and the resulting risk of impairment thereof is not significant.
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A full discussion of the legal effect of, and applicable limitations on, such a State "pledge" (involving analysis of the applicable constitutional protections under the Contract Clause 8 and against improper "takings" 9 ), the degree to which prior orders of one regulatory authority bind a later regulatory authority or the deference in any subsequent regulatory proceedings to be afforded to the prior order, and these other requirements are beyond the scope of this article; 10 however, the rating agencies apparently have become comfortable with these risks, since they rate these transactions in their highest rating categories.
On June 28, 2002 Historical performance of these stranded costs securitizations generally has been sound 13 and, accordingly, prior investor experience with respect to such securitizations has been positive. Notably, this history has included a related utility bankruptcy (Pacific Gas & Electric) and a utility merger (Northwestern's acquisition of Montana Power).
Extension of Stranded Cost Securitization to Mandated Pollution Control
Recently, there have been some other transactions that utilize stranded costs securitization methodologies to allow utilities to finance mandated pollution control equipment and other similar environmental capital expenditures and, especially for affected coastal utilities, to recover or provide for storm recovery and reconstruction costs. The opportunity to extend stranded costs securitization techniques to these other applications has been duly noted by the rating agencies.
14 Perhaps the first attempt to extend stranded costs securitization techniques to mandated pollution control requirements was the proposed $490 million of so-called "environmental trust bonds" authorized 15 16 This Act authorizes Wisconsin utilities to use such environmental trust bonds to finance environmental improvements on utility facilities, for the environmental trust bonds to be repaid from revenues collected from a fee placed on the bills of the utility customers and states that a bond issue would be governed by a Wisconsin Public Service Commission financing order, which would, among other things, create a property right to the collection of the fees from the utility's customers and to the revenues collected therefrom. The Act also provides that the utility will transfer this right to a third party, which will collect the fees for repayment of the debt. Further, the Act states that the debt associated with the bonds will not be shown on the books of the related utility. 18 to finance the installation of flue gas desulphurization (commonly referred to as "scrubbers") and related facilities on the Fort Martin coal-fired power plant in Monongalia County, West Virginia. The bonds were rated AAA by Standard & Poor's and Aaa by Moody's Investors Services, which ratings were superior to those of the related utilities. The required financing order 19 was issued after a protracted proceeding and was later amended by joint stipulation to accelerate the securitization and to take advantage of thenperceived attractive interest rates and to avoid the risk of further escalation of project costs for the scrubbers and related facilities. 17 Accordingly, the related environmental trust bond indebtedness will not affect the related utility's regular rates and it external ratings and credit will be largely unaffected by such indebtedness, since such indebtedness is of the special purpose entity to whom the stranded cost charges are assigned in the required "true sale" thereof and is effectively backed and covered by the permitted charges that are securitized. 18 
Extension of Stranded Cost Securitization to Storm Reconstruction
Similarly, stranded cost securitization techniques have been used to finance storm recovery or reconstruction costs for affected coastal utilities.
Following Hurricane Andrew in 1995, commercial insurance for property or casualty damage to electric transmission and distribution facilities of coastal utilities became substantially more expensive (even with substantially larger deductibles or self-insurance) or unavailable on commercially acceptable terms. For the following decade, coastal utilities were often permitted to charge rates in amounts thought sufficient to establish appropriate reserves for storm recovery and reconstruction. These reserves were effectively depleted in the devastating U.S. hurricane season of 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma (in insurance and other circles commonly referred to as "KRW"), and the reserve accounts of affected coastal utilities were rendered substantially negative.
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As to be expected, the States of Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas all passed laws facilitating storm recovery securitization. 24 The first completed transaction to take advantage of these new laws was the $ 
Proposed Extension of Stranded Cost Securitization to Synthetic Carbon Reduction
With growing certainty that greenhouse gas (including carbon dioxide or CO 2 , GHG) emissions will become regulated due to climate change concerns, many affected industries are actively exploring ways in which to avoid or limit GHG emissions. One significantly affected industry is fossil-fired power generation, especially coal-fired generation, since combustion of coal produces substantial amounts of carbon dioxide. In fact, coal-fired power plants in the United States emitted almost 2,000 million metric tonnes of CO 2 (equivalent) in 2006, 30 representing almost one-third of the total GHG emissions in the United States in 2006.
With large-scale carbon reduction technology for fossil-fired power generation still (at least to most objective observers) not yet commercially proven, fossil-fired plant owners or, even more acutely, fossil-fired plant developers or sponsors face some limited and mostly unattractive options in pursuing coal-fired power plant development or retrofit, including: first, wait-and-see what the carbon reduction requirements will be and run the risk that appropriate technology will be (or will not be) then available and, if available, will be available on commercially reasonable terms; second, opt for some unproven technology and hope that it works as projected; and, third, anticipate likely carbon reduction requirements and satisfy such requirements "synthetically" through tradable carbon reduction instruments, 31 thereby preserving optionality for the determination of the most appropriate technology to effect the anticipated carbon reduction requirements and theoretically allowing for the most cost-effective means of such carbon reduction through use of traded carbon emission reduction instruments.
Interestingly, in the case of several proposed fossil-fired power plants, community objections to carbon emissions (even though technically unregulated) led to negotiated commitments by plant sponsors to implement carbon emission reduction. 32 With announced new U.S. coal-fired power plants with an aggregate capacity of around 50 Gigawatts and an ever increasing number thereof being either abandoned or significantly delayed due to community objections 33 or regulatory concerns 34 regarding possible carbon controls due to climate change legislation or regulation, the need to deal with anticipated climate change requirements that limit or otherwise restrict emissions of carbon dioxide has become (or will become) a significant issue in the near-term, since it will not be practical to replace such coal-fired capacity with alternative sources, including renewable energy or nuclear generation. In fact, the North America Reliability Corp.'s annual 2007 Long-Term Reliability Assessment [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] 35 found long-term capacity reserve margins inadequate and that action is required to restore such margins to adequate levels, 36 Areas of most concern include California, New England, Texas and the Midwest 37 . It is unlikely that this capacity will be available through demand-side measures or the addition of renewable energy (wind or solar) or nuclear generation, which require special considerations for the planning, design, and operation of bulk power markets. Renewable resources are often characterized by their remote location, interconnection over difficult terrain and, due to their intermittent nature, the related requirements for base load dispatch flexibility, spinning reserves, voltage support, and other ancillary services for the related market. 38 Since the carbon reduction technologies that will be required are still not yet commercially proven, estimates of the associated costs are more speculative than usual, but it is reasonably certain that the total will be several hundreds of billions of dollars. Again the compliance costs (including the proposed "synthetic" compliance) could be securitized using stranded cost securitization techniques, which would provide efficient financing therefor and permit greater optionality regarding the need for, and timing of, the determination of what are the most appropriate equipment and facilities to effect the required carbon reduction and when to install such equipment and facilities.
Conclusion
With the demonstrable success of stranded cost securitizations, it is not a difficult prediction that similar securitizations should perform well and this has already been successfully demonstrated by some similar transactions for mandated environmental control expenditures and storm reconstruction costs.
The opportunity to use stranded cost securitization techniques to satisfy community, regulatory and other requirements for GHG reductions, yet defer critical and potentially imprudent decisions regarding specific related plant and equipment for such reductions until the related reduction technology is commercially-proven, should also be attractive to fossil-fired power plant owners, developers and sponsors. * * * * *
